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A Message from the Prime Minister

I am pleased to have this opportunity to send my greetings to the editors and readers of the annual Lithuanian Studies Society’s journal Lithuanian Papers.

Lithuanian Papers provides a wealth of information about current Lithuanian issues and Lithuania’s rich culture and history. Its readership spans many countries, linking Lithuanian communities both with each other and with a range of other cultures. The Lithuanian Studies Society, which produces this journal, is one of the many instances of Lithuanian Australians contributing to the rich mosaic of Australian multiculturalism.

Lithuanian Australians enrich the wider Australian community through their active participation and efforts to develop cross-cultural understanding. Lithuanian Australians make outstanding contributions to a myriad of aspects of Australian society, including dance, art and sport. Many Lithuanian Australians have become prominent and respected community members and continue to enhance the diversity of our society.

Congratulations to all those involved in producing Lithuanian Papers. I wish them and the readers of this journal all the best.

John HOWARD
Prime Minister of Australia
Lithuania - Main Facts

Location: on the Eastern shores of the Baltic Sea.
Area: 65,300 square kilometres (25,212 square miles), about the size of Tasmania or West Virginia.
Capital: Vilnius (population 580,100).
Form of Government: Parliamentary republic.
Head of State: President (Valdas Adamkus).
National assembly: Seimas (parliament), consisting of 141 members who are elected for 4-year terms.
Chairman of Seimas: Professor Vytautas Landsbergis.

Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic (estimated 80%). A number of other religions are also practised: Evangelical Lutheran, Russian Orthodox, Judaic, etc.
Population density: 56.8 per 1 square km.
Chief Products: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, light industry.
Greatest distances: East-West 373 km, North-South 276 km.
Highest points: Juozapinė (293.6 metres), Kruopinė (293.4m), Nevaišiai (288.9m).
Major rivers: Nemunas (937.4km), Neris (509.5km).
Largest lakes: Druksiai (4479ha), Dysnai (2439.4ha), Dusia (2334.2ha). Altogether, there are over 4,000 lakes in Lithuania. Of these, 2,830 are larger than 0.5 ha, covering a total area of 880 sq.km.
Climate: Temperate, between maritime and continental. Mean annual temperature is 6.7 degrees Celsius. Average January temperature in Vilnius is -4.3 deg.C; July average, 18.1 deg. C. Annual precipitation 744.6 mm. Humidity 78%.
National currency: Litas, equals 100 centas. Exchange rate (approx.): 4 Litas equals US$1; or approx.2.20 Litas equals AU$1. However, these exchange rates may vary daily.

Sources: LR Gov.'s Statistics Dept., Lithuanian Heritage, Lithuania in the World.
Ignored in their Suffering

John MAŠANAUSKAS
Melbourne

Vida Vaitiekūnas points to a picture of her mother and recalls the Lithuanian woman’s singular act of bravery during World War II. At great personal risk, her mother, Konstancija Bražienienė, sheltered two Jewish children from Nazis occupying her country. “When we got my mother to America decades later I asked her if she wasn’t scared involving the whole family in such danger,” Mrs Vaitiekūnas said. “My mother said, ‘I was terribly scared. But I thought, maybe God will help me. If I don’t do anything the children will certainly perish.’” Happily, the children -- Sarah Capelowitz and Alex Gringauz -- survived and went on to flourish in the West.

But Mrs Bražienienė, a widow, wasn’t so lucky. Having survived the Nazi occupation, she had to deal with the return of Soviet forces which had first invaded Lithuania in 1940. Rejecting her daughter’s pleas to flee, Mrs Bražienienė insisted that she must stay and care for her mother and mother-in-law. In November 1948, she paid the price for her principles when Communist officials knocked on her door and told her to pack quickly for a long journey.

* Konstancija Bražienienė (centre), reunited with the Jewish youngsters she had saved: Sarah Capelowitz (right) and Alex Gringauz.
Mrs Bražienė was deported to Siberia -- one of hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians sent to the Gulag under Joseph Stalin's policy to crush national resistance.

While many died in the harsh conditions, Mrs Bražienė somehow survived and in 1956 was allowed to return to Lithuania due to ill-health. Mrs Vaitiekūnas, who had settled in Australia, tried for several years to get her mother out of the Soviet Union.

In 1966, the Soviets finally relented and Mrs Bražienė was given an exit visa to join another daughter who was living in the US. Mrs Vaitiekūnas, who lives in Essendon (a suburb of Melbourne), said she felt compelled to tell her mother's story because of current publicity over Nazi war crimes. She said the pursuit of Baltic suspects, such as Latvian-born Konrads Kalejs, had given the impression that Baltic people generally were implicated in war crimes.

"It's very hard to discuss these issues with Jewish people," Mrs Vaitiekūnas said. "They condemn all Lithuanians as killers of Jews, but it was only a handful who did this."

Mrs Vaitiekūnas said, there were thousands of people like her mother who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust, but little was reported about them.

In 1985, Israel recognised her mother's deeds and posthumously awarded her the Medal of the Righteous for saving the two Jewish children. Mrs Bražienė, who died in 1970, also had an emotional reunion with Mr Gringauz and Ms Capelowitz in New York soon after arriving from the Soviet Union.

Mrs Vaitiekūnas said while she understood the Jewish community's pursuit of justice for Nazi victims, she was concerned that victims of communism had been virtually ignored.

The three nations were economically devastated by collectivisation and their people controlled by a reign of terror.

Mrs Vaitiekūnas said that, apart from her mother's repression, she lost a brother-in-law who had been a resistance fighter. The man was killed in a Lithuanian forest by Soviet forces in 1951 and to this day his family have no idea where he is buried. Due to draconian Soviet travel restrictions that lasted until the late 1980s, very few direct victims of Communism made it to the West until recently.

One such person is Cheltenham grandmother Marija Geštautas, who was born in the Gulag after her parents were deported from Lithuania in 1941. Mrs Geštautas was separated from her father and barely saw her mother, who was forced to work in a labour camp.

In 1949, she and her mother illegally returned to Lithuania and were discovered by authorities.

Her mother was sentenced to another three years of Siberian exile. Mrs Geštautas, who migrated to Australia four years ago, said the world didn't know enough about victims of Communism. "When I tell people what happened they're amazed, they can't believe such a thing," she said.
Anger as Israel holds out

Israel has refused to co-operate with Lithuania over a former Soviet official suspected of communist war crimes in the Baltic country.

Lithuanian prosecutors want to interview former KGB officer Nachman Duchanski who went to Israel in 1989 after allegations about his past were raised.

Mr Duchanski, 81, is suspected of being involved in the deportation of Lithuanians during World War II and the persecution of anti-communist partisans after the war.

In April 1999, Lithuania asked Israeli authorities to help locate Mr Duchanski and put the allegations to him.

Lithuanian senior prosecutor Rimvydas Valentukevičius told the Herald Sun that Israel declined the request in February this year and the investigation has been suspended.

Director of the Israeli State Attorney Office Irit Kohn said in her response that Lithuania was discriminating against Mr Duchanski because his former KGB superiors still living in Lithuania were not being prosecuted.

"Discrimination of this sort would be contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates equal protection of the law", she said.

Mr Valentukevičius said, the Israeli response was absurd.

"According to that logic, any killer or thief could escape justice if other killers and thieves involved in totally different crimes are not caught", he said.

Lithuania rejects claims of discrimination, especially as it is currently investigating an Adelaide man suspected of involvement in the killing of Jews during the Nazi occupation.

The former president of the Australian Latvian Federation, Aivars Saulitis, accused Israel of double standards.

- JOHN MAŠANAUSKAS.
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Lithuania: In Search of Security and Identity
Gražina MINIOTAITĖ
Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology

Introduction
With the restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1990, the country's security and foreign policies are closely linked with the processes of state building and political identity formation. In trying to rebuild a statehood Lithuania has been shaping a new political identity vacillating between two poles: the particularity of a nation-state (sovereignty discourse) and the universality of a European unit (integration discourse). In this respect, post-communist Lithuania offers a particularly interesting case study.

The analysis is based on the hypothesis that Lithuania's political reality has been conceptualized in terms of at least two competitive discourses: a discourse on sovereignty and another one on integration, each of these implemented in different discursive practices (Bartelson, 1995; Diez, 1999). It is claimed that Lithuania's Foreign security policy (FSP) is based on the interplay of these two discourses. In the paper an attempt is made, within the framework of such hypothesis, to capture the link between security conceptualizations, constitution of political identity and Lithuania's FSP.

Security Conceptualizations
Lithuania's political life presents ample material for analysis of conceptualizations of security. Since 1990 the problems of national security have been regarded to be of major importance. This has found its expression in four projects of the security system for Lithuania and finally in the Basics of National Security of Lithuania (BNSL) adopted by the Seimas in December, 1996 (Basics, 1996).

The conceptualizations of security at the documents, though differing in contents and in some of their presuppositions, are mainly based on the paradigm of realism. Security is conceived as the preservation of a fixed and unchanging entity (the nation, the
state), as the identification of the threats it faces and as their neutralization by political and military means. These ideas are squarely within a sovereignty-based discourse. This is only natural, since the goal of the documents is the justification of the nation state security and of the nation state foreign policy. The goal of integration with the West, as formulated in the BNSL document, is still based on the meanings of sovereignty discourse. I will try to substantiate the claim by reviewing the development of Lithuania's foreign and security policies since the declaration of independence, concentrating mostly on the issues of Baltic states' cooperation, relations between Lithuania and Poland and pro-Western orientations.

Lithuania and the other Baltic States: allied or separate?

Let us consider, in the context of the sovereignty and the integration discourses, the development of Lithuania's relations with the other Baltic States since the restoration of their independence. Despite a number of historical and cultural differences between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, at the level of international relations they are usually not differentiated and are treated as a whole, the Baltic States.

However, in implementing their basically similar foreign policies the Baltic States have at the same time regressed on the issue of their own mutual integration. This is somewhat paradoxical, for formally there are numerous institutions for their co-operation, including the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Free Trade Agreement, as well as some common initiatives in matters of defence. Yet, the dominant public opinion in Lithuania is that the relations among the Baltic States are unsatisfactory. Retrospectively, one can say that before the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Baltic States in 1994 the Baltic states acted as a geopolitical unit in respect of their foreign and security policies. Since that time, however, despite common initiatives, a mutual competition has evolved. It plays out in the pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening of respective state's sovereignty.

This is clearly demonstrated by the peculiarities of Lithuanian -
North, while Lithuania, since 1995, has been turning to the South, that is, in the direction of Poland and Central Europe.

**Lithuania and Poland: Between the Past and the Future**

The development of Lithuanian-Polish relations since 1990 is a good illustration of the mixture between the sovereignty and the integration discourses in Lithuania's political and public life. The two countries have old historical links. One can speak of their common history starting with the Lublin Union (1569) which brought the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into existence. The common history includes both joint uprisings against the Russian Empire in the 19th century and also the Polish occupation of Vilnius in 1920. The territorial conflict between Lithuania and Poland constituted the *leitmotif* of the foreign and security policy of interwar Lithuania. The conflict isolated Lithuania from the other Baltic States and led to a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It is hardly surprising that in the dynamics of Polish-Lithuanian relations in the 1990-ties, historical arguments played a prominent role. One can distinguish three stages in the dynamics of this short period.

The first stage was the period from the declaration of Lithuania's independence on March 11, 1990 till the August putsch (1991) in Moscow. It was characterized by Poland's unqualified support for the Lithuanian case (with the exception of official recognition). After the August putsch, when Lithuania achieved international recognition, the relations between the two countries deteriorated. By taking interwar Lithuania as the model, the image of Poland as Lithuania's malicious enemy was naturally embraced. The image was also influential in shaping early Lithuanian policies in the 1990s towards the Polish ethnic minority. A gradual improvement in Lithuanian-Polish relations began in 1992. The year 1994 was the turning point in Polish-Lithuanian relations. The change was related to the rise in Central European states towards closer association with NATO. Poland was turned into 'a bridge linking Lithuania with the EU and NATO'. However, the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania and of the Lithuanian minority in Poland are still live issues. In order to tackle them, a bilateral commission was created in May 1999. However, their solution is possible by a gradual substitution of the normative assumptions of the sovereignty discourse by those of the integration discourse.

**From Eastern to Western Identity?**

In the constitution of Lithuania's political identity conceptualizations of the East and the West play a prominent role, directing her FSP towards the West.

The concepts of the East and the West are highly value-loaded with the West being associated with prosperity, security and democracy whereas, the East is loaded with poverty, unpredictability, totalitarianism, insecurity. The pro-Western orientation has been expressed by such radical political decisions as the application for membership in NATO (1994) and the signing of the European Agreement (1995).

However, the very process of getting closer to the West is a potential source of internal and external tensions. In supporting the democratisation processes in Russia, the West has aimed at creating a common security space encompassing both Russia and the Baltic states. Nevertheless, in the Lithuanian political discourse, Russia plays the role of a main threat to Lithuania's security. Lithuanian politicians compare Lithuania's proximity to Russia with living next to a volcano that can erupt at any time. Such political rhetoric finds its expression in official documents as well as in policy making. So in 1992 the Seimas adopted a constitutional act, "On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances (1992), which has aimed to prevent any agreements with the former Soviet republics.

An image of Russia as a multidimensional threat to Lithuania is presented in the "Basics of National Security of Lithuania" - a main document that defines Lithuania's security policy (adopted by Seimas in 1996). The document lists such "potential external risks and dangers" as "political pressure and dictates, attempts to establish zones of special interest and ensure special rights, preventing Lithuania from obtaining international security; threats by foreign states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests;
attempts to impose upon Lithuania dangerous and discriminatory international agreements"; etc. (Basics, 1996:10-11). Though the document makes no reference to particular countries as posing a threat for Lithuania's security, anyone familiar with the realities of the region would easily discern that all these dangers are assumed as originating from Russia. Thus, in the political discourse of Lithuania, Russia has the permanently constituted identity as an unpredictable threatening entity. Such a conceptualization of Russia finds a response first of all among those Russian politicians who are focused on restoring the Russian empire with Lithuania as part of it.

This East-West opposition in shaping Lithuania's political identity points to the conclusion that the conceptualization of her political life is still firmly within the sovereignty discourse. Integration with the West has been mostly of instrumental nature, a mode of survival in an unpredictable environment. The proclaimed 'pro-Western' orientation of foreign and security policy finds its expression mostly in 'anti-Eastern' political decisions and in the politicization of economic and social life. (Miniotaite, 2000).

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References

"Lithuania and NATO: An Odd Couple?"

Thomas R. POOLE  
University of Queensland

The issue of admission to NATO looms large in Lithuania's immediate future. If all goes according to plan, the next NATO summit in 2002 will invite Lithuania (and other Central European democracies) to join the collective defence alliance, thus redeeming the 'Open Door' policy announced more than a year ago by NATO powers at the Washington Summit and fulfilling the promise, in the words of the Vilnius Statement, of "a Europe whole and free".1

Lithuania has formally sought union with NATO since January 1994 and joining the Alliance remains a prime goal of its foreign policy2. The reasons for Vilnius ardently seeking admission to the premier military pact in Europe are both understandable and compelling. As part of the Baltic region, described by James Kurth as the "East of the West, and West of the East,"3 Lithuania rests uneasily in a geographical vice between Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, an awkward strategic situation that could be partially overcome through membership in NATO.

Once covered by Article 5 of the NATO Charter, guaranteeing collective security, the possibility of Lithuania or the other Baltic countries being sacrificed once again to 'superior' Russian interests through a misguided exercise in western Realpolitik would become much more unlikely, perhaps inconceivable.

The security vacuum, or 'gray area', that presently confronts military planners in East-Central Europe, would be filled with NATO's formidable presence and Lithuania's membership in the western alliance would help reinforce its European credentials.

1 Vilnius Statement" (19 May 1999), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, p. 2.  
2 "Lithuania's Foreign Policy", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.  
The proposed 'match' with NATO would seem to answer all of Lithuania's prayers, most notably acting as a weighty deterrent to aggression but also providing a 'hard' guarantee of collective defence if a revanchist Russia should ever again encroach on Lithuanian territory.

The Euro-Atlantic community should treat Lithuania's application for membership as a moral obligation, considering its often tragic history and repeated sacrifices, but the Baltic nation, in any event, meets almost effortlessly the prime criteria for admittance set down by NATO in its Membership Action Plan, being a vigorous free-market democracy with a superior record on civil and political rights, and with its military firmly under civilian control. Best of all, internal and external strife are all but unknown, with the 8-9% Russian minority being granted dual citizenship and a 1997 agreement with Moscow settling outstanding border issues.

Moreover, Vilnius has embarked on an ambitious program to increase its defence expenditures to a respectable 2% of GDP by 2001, and in pursuit of the elusive goal of "interoperability" has actively participated in regional military formations such as BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion), BALTRON (Baltic Naval Squadron), BALTNET (Baltic Air Surveillance) and BALTDEFCOL (Baltic Defence College), as well as the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR contingents in Bosnia, and KFOR in Kosovo. At the very least, Lithuania has mastered Brussels-speak, seemingly a crucial test for any prospective Alliance partner!

Niggling doubts remain, however, about Lithuania's avid courting of Brussels, in particular about the likely fidelity of the intended partner (NATO) and also about the reaction of the jilted rival (Russia). Would NATO actually honour its pledge to defend Lithuania, as an Alliance partner, if it meant a European-wide war?

And would Russia quietly acquiesce in the extension of a once hostile military alliance to a former USSR republic right on its doorstep? A very real possibility exists that Lithuania (and the other Baltic nations), in an understandable quest for gaining enhanced security through collective defence commitments, will actually end up with diminished security, and become a dangerously exposed buffer state, facing an irate and truculent Russia.

The doctrine of 'mutual security' presupposes, as Mikhail Gorbachev used to state repeatedly, that all states feel equally secure, and that no nation enjoys security to the disadvantage of another country. In this regard, Richard J. Krickus has astutely written, the "Baltic states want their massive neighbor to feel secure, because an insecure Russia represents a threat to Europe." Is joining NATO, which Moscow regards with grave suspicion as a Cold War remnant, the best way for Lithuania to lessen the profound insecurity that its troubled and humiliated neighbour is experiencing at the dawn of the twenty-first century?

5 "Integration of Lithuania into NATO: Lithuanian Defence Structures: Moving Towards Interoperability with NATO" http://www.urm.lt/nato/interoperability.htm
NATO planners during the last decade have greeted the possibility of the Baltic States joining the Alliance with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. At least in some quarters, Lithuania is considered militarily indefensible, especially with conventional arms. Besides the practical problems associated with transporting and maintaining a military force so deep in East-Central Europe, Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick have put forth other reasons for NATO members being decidedly lukewarm about extending defense commitments into the Baltic region, citing an alleged lack of strategic importance, the risk of becoming embroiled in minority and border disputes, and the problem of being outflanked by Russian forces in Kaliningrad, which lead them to the conclusion "that the hurdles for Baltic membership in NATO are high - considerably higher than for many other countries." Of course, Lithuania as a member state would come under the NATO nuclear umbrella, but would Brussels, if push came to shove, trade London or Paris or even Lithuanian-populated Chicago for Vilnius? The strategist Alan Sweedler has stated flatly that "barring major Russian armed aggression in Europe, the Nordic and Baltic states should not count on U.S. military support if conflict erupts and is limited to the Baltic region." The same conclusion appears to be held in at least some Russian circles. Certainly the present author has never encountered a single informed Russian who believes that the West will lift a finger to protect the Baltic States. The "curtain of indifference" of the Great Powers in the interwar period would tend to bear out this harsh view. Lithuanian leaders must face squarely the question: is NATO trustworthy?

The primary reason, of course, for NATO's reluctance to include the Baltic area in the collective security pact stems from a strong reluctance to offend Russian sensitivities. Officially Brussels strenuously denies that Moscow has any kind of veto or droit de regard over the inclusion of new members, but almost in the same breadth the colossus to the East is described as an "immutable fact" or "force of nature" that cannot be ignored. Moreover, NATO must concede that expansion to Lithuania would result in the encirclement of Kaliningrad and the possible stationing of Alliance forces only 240 kilometres from Russia's second largest city, St. Petersburg, a fact that Russian military planners must keep in mind. If NATO expansion were conceived as hostile encirclement, then a particularly virulent form of paranoia might emerge in Russian political circles.10

Undoubtedly much of the Sturm und Drang coming out of Moscow about the danger of drawing a new 'red line' across the map of Europe is designed to intimidate western policy makers, but a genuine fear appears to exist in the Kremlin that NATO, primarily a military bloc, wants to supplant Russian influence in its neighbouring area and isolate it from other European countries. Vladimir K. Volkov has warned that "admitting any former Soviet Republic into NATO would be regarded by Russia as a provocative move;" with unforeseen consequences.11 No amount of rhetoric emanating from Brussels about NATO's expansion eastwards being part of a 'European package' that includes democracy, human rights and the free market and that the mission of the 'new NATO' entails promoting peace, social stability and democratic values, albeit with the aid of tanks,12 is likely to calm the nerves of uneasy strategists in


12 The Russian liberal leader Grigoriy Yavlinskii has amusingly suggested that even if NATO paints its 'peaceful tanks' pink and dresses them up with flowers and dancing girls, Siberian peasants would conclude: 'Still it is a tank'. Quoted in Roland Dannreuther, "Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations", Survival, 41-4 (Winter 1999-2000), p. 154.
Moscow. Even the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, set up in 1997 to allow a continuous forum for discussing vexed questions, has failed to placate the suspicious and marginalised Russians, especially after NATO's unilateral intervention over furious Russian protests in the sovereign affairs of Yugoslavia.

A more imaginative approach to strategic thinking is necessary, one that goes beyond the Cold-War mindset of a Henry Kissinger or the rosy-tinted views of a Anatol Lieven. Various suggestions have been made, including that Lithuania and the other NATO candidates in East-Central Europe should be satisfied with 'qualified membership' which would give them necessary security guarantees without unduly ruffling Russian feathers. This might entail the extension of NATO's 'four nos' policy on the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members to the stationing of permanent forces in the Baltic republics. In fact, the NATO-Russia Founding Act pledges the Alliance to carry out its collective defence mission through interoperability and reinforcement "rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Such a 'soft' defence capability, gained through joint exercises, coordinated planning and the prepositioning of military equipment, might prove unacceptable to an understandably sceptical Vilnius, but it could be combined with a strengthened network of 'peace-making' organisations throughout Europe, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which includes all European states, but particularly through an expanded European Union (EU).

In fact, one observer has stated that the "more the NATO question is embedded in the EU question, the less confrontation there will be between NATO and Russia." Asmus and Nurick have gone so far as to suggest that extending membership to Estonia in the next stage of EU enlargement, even if Latvia and Lithuania were overlooked, would set an important precedent in that at least one Baltic state would be incorporated into 'the West' and any Russian move against a EU member-state would severely compromise its relations with Europe as a whole, thus "a form of linkage between Russian behaviour towards the Baltic states and the EU's overall relationship with Russia would be established." An even more favoured option, however, is the 'Finnish model' - membership in the European Union, observer status in the Western European Union and participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. The result might be, according to Kurth, that the Baltic States were: "economically and culturally part of the West, politically independent of the West and Russia, and militarily neutral and unthreatening to Russia." Perhaps, more ominously, this...
possibility has also been recommended by the former Russian Ambassador to Helsinki, Yuri Deryabin, who even claimed that Russia would not object to a country like Estonia cooperating with Finland on security matters. Of course, the absolute *sine qua non* of emulating the Finnish self-sufficiency doctrine is the willingness, and ability to defend to the death national independence against all comers.

Such a 'Special Baltic Security Order', short of full NATO membership, might well prove anathema to Lithuanians with long memories who remember how another ambiguous security arrangement failed in the interwar years. But this writer is impressed by certain truisms.

Firstly, any new security architecture in East-Central Europe should be *inclusive*, not *exclusive*, and Russia should be *in*, not *out*, even if that includes possible membership in NATO at some later date.

Secondly, membership in NATO is only a *means* toward ensuring Lithuanian and Baltic security, not the final goal in itself. Strategic vision and subtle diplomatic skills could *possibly* devise even better security guarantees than membership in a collective defence alliance.

Thirdly, Vilnius already enjoys better relations with Moscow than either Tallinn or Riga, and has recognised Russia's legitimate security needs by providing a transportation corridor to the isolated garrison in Kaliningrad. *Opening, not closing this gateway* to the West would seem to be in Lithuania's long-term interests.

As Algirdas Brazauskas has written, "Having restored her independence, Lithuania has once again become a European state - a bridge at which the roads and interests of East and West, and North and South, cross and intertwine. Our task is to balance the interests and influences that converge in Lithuania," states the former Lithuanian President.

Lastly this writer, as an historian, would caution against reasoning *from history*, a notoriously unreliable and unrewarding endeavour. What happened in 1795 and 1940 need not happen again. People, and nations, do change their spots.

In the long term, Lithuania must reach some kind of accommodation with Russia, an eternal reality to its East, and with Europe to its West, but not necessarily with the United States. Dependence on a U.S.-led security alliance could prove counter-productive and self-defeating if America adopts its own self-sufficiency doctrine based on a national missile defence system. Washington does not need Lithuania and Lithuanians, except at election time, but Vilnius needs good relations with all its neighbours, near and far, especially with a Russia that has a long memory for affronts against what it conceives as its national dignity.

Thomas R. Poole, B.A. (Princeton), M.A. (Kansas), Ph.D. (Mass.) is a Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Queensland. His areas of specialisation include Russian - Australian relations and the Baltic region.

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18 Ibid., p.140.
19 Quoted in Peeter Vares, "Russia and the Baltic States: Are there Common Security Perspectives?" in *Common Security In Northern Europe after the Cold War*, p.144.
20 In exchange for Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty and allow the construction of a National Missile Defence system, the incoming administration in Washington might be tempted to offer a *quid pro quo* and meet Russian objections to NATO's expansion into East-Central Europe.
Corruption in the Baltic Countries, with Particular Reference to Lithuania

Leslie HOLMES
University of Melbourne

For the first time in 1998, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that had been produced annually since 1995 by the world’s leading anti-corruption quango, Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), included two Baltic states. Of particular interest was the fact that these two appeared at opposite ends of the spectrum. While Estonia was ranked as the ‘cleanest’ (least corrupt) of all the twelve post-communist states in the table, Latvia emerged as second worst – just ahead of what was perceived to be the most corrupt of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, Russia.

TI’s latest CPI was published in October 1999, and includes all three Baltic States. Estonia emerges as the least corrupt of the three, and second only to Slovenia among the ‘cleanest’ post-communist countries. The inclusion for the first time of several Central Asian and Caucasian post-communist states partly explains the fact that Latvia fared better than it had the previous year. But the improvement was genuine; Latvia raised its score from 2.7 out of 10 (where 10 represents a perceived absence of corruption in a country) to 3.4; this compares with Estonia’s 5.7 in 1999 (exactly the same as in 1998). Lithuania, which made its first appearance in the CPI in 1999, was located between its two neighbours, at 3.8. For the record, among the 99 countries (25 of them post-communist) included in the 1999 CPI, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were at positions 27, 50 and 58 respectively.

The somewhat polarised picture painted by TI is counter-intuitive. While people who know Estonia should not be particularly surprised at its positioning, many have expressed doubts – amazement even – that Latvia was seen in the 1998 CPI as not only much worse than Estonia, but worse than China, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The 1999 CPI looks closer to most observers’ intuition, with Latvia being perceived as less corrupt than Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine – though still only on a par with China and Belarus. Obviously, Lithuania emerges as cleaner than all of the countries just listed – but is also seen as less corrupt than Slovakia, and only slightly more than Poland.

Certainly, one of the most well respected American assessments, that produced by Freedom House, differs from the TI assessment on the question of the Baltic States. According to its Nations in Transit – 1998, the three Baltic states have rather similar levels of corruption; all are in the second (‘B’) group of post-communist states, where A are the cleanest countries (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and D the most corrupt (mainly CIS states, plus Albania).

Can official statistics provide a more accurate picture than those based on surveys? Unfortunately, statistics on corruption, while of some curiosity value, mean little – either in Lithuania or anywhere else (for an analysis of some rather dated Lithuanian figures, see Girnius 1994). Corruption is an unusual crime, in that it typically has no clearly identifiable ‘victim’ who would report it; officials often work in isolation or else are in collusion with others who could be in as much trouble with the authorities for reporting corruption as the corrupt official him- or herself would be. Hence, official statistics almost certainly reflect only the tip of the iceberg (in any country).

Despite all these methodological problems, let us assume that Lithuania is more corrupt than Estonia, and somewhat less corrupt than Latvia; after all, TI’s CPI is based on a large number of opinion surveys on each country. What might be the reasons for this?

In such a short article, I can only scratch the surface in addressing this issue. Nevertheless, it is hoped that some insight into corruption in the region will be afforded by identifying three variables in particular – geopolitics; the perception of corruption levels based on cases reported in the media; and the impact of different development strategies adopted in the three countries.
If we focus on allegations of corruption at the highest levels, all three Baltic States can be seen to have experienced scandals in recent years. There have been several concerning prime ministers, for instance; examples include Estonia’s Tiit Vahi in February 1997; Latvia’s Andris Skele in July 1997; and Lithuania’s Adolfaes Slezevičius in 1995-6 and Gediminas Vagnorius in April 1999. If we look below the top political levels, we find numerous further examples; unfortunately, space limitations preclude a consideration of them here (useful English-language sources are Baltic Times and the Baltic Review). But detailed surveys of businesspeople both working in and dealing with the Baltic states also help to explain why these countries do not have better images.

A July 1995 World Bank survey of 200 Lithuanian businesspeople revealed that 54% of those operating in Vilnius and Kaunas had paid bribes to officials; according to the same survey, some 80% of foreign businesspeople dealing with Lithuania claimed they had been asked to pay bribes, while a staggering 90% indicated that corruption was preventing them from investing further in Lithuania (cited in Girnius 1995).

A 1997 survey of 1017 Lithuanians revealed that ‘criminalisation of society’, ‘corruption of the power structures’ and ‘complete lawlessness’ ranked 4th, 5th and 7th respectively out of 45 possible factors respondents could cite as those they most feared in their country (Shubkin and Ivanova 1999, pp.32-6). And a 1998 World Bank survey in Latvia revealed that some 60% of companies and households interviewed believed that corruption had increased in their country over the previous four years; most people considered the main reason for this to be a lack of commitment to the fight against corruption on the part of cabinet ministers.

Assuming corruption really is a serious problem in the Baltic countries, why is it apparently less so in Estonia than in the other two states? A number of reasons have been suggested. One is that Estonia is more influenced by its Nordic neighbours than are Latvia or Lithuania; when it is borne in mind that the top three (i.e., perceived as least corrupt) countries in the 1999 CPI were Denmark, Finland and Sweden (the last equal third with New Zealand), it is clear that if Estonia really is more influenced by its Scandinavian neighbours and Finland – and less by Russia - this might be part of the explanation.

Another factor sometimes suggested is that the Estonians are simply less prone than the Latvians or the Lithuanians to ‘wash their dirty linen in public’. If cases are less often and less sensationally reported in the Estonian media, it is likely that citizens and those who interact with citizens (including foreign businesspeople) will believe that corruption is less salient a feature of everyday life than in countries where the media have a field day with almost every allegation of corruption.

But there is probably another factor at work, and that is the impact of radical economic policies. For reasons that cannot be explored here, the introduction of aspects of neo-liberalism (economic rationalism) in many Western countries has been seen to have led to an increase in corruption (see Della Porta and Mény 1997). It might be inferred from this that the introduction of neo-liberal policies in
CEE countries should also lead to an increase in corruption. However, the relationship is more complex in post-communist transition states than in the West. Basically, while both the communist legacy and neo-liberalism can raise corruption levels, my own long-term research across the post-communist world suggests that the communist legacy raises them - or keeps them high - more than neo-liberalism. Lithuania stunned the world in late-1992, when a so-called communist successor party won the election, and many feel, whether justifiably or not, that bad habits from the communist era are taking longer to disappear there than they should. Conversely, Estonia has opted for a more radical rejection of the past, which might explain why it fares better, though still not well compared with most West European countries.

But it is never too late. Lithuania has been learning from its own experiences and vicariously. It knows that its neighbour to the North is benefitting from its reputation as a less corrupt and more economically ‘progressive’ country. While Latvia and Lithuania are in the ‘second tranche’ of CEE applicants to the EU, Estonia is in the first, for example. If Lithuania accelerates reform and, as a corollary, reduces corruption, it is likely to benefit. The government has been doing this in recent months, despite public opposition. While it is all too easy for someone in a comfortable and affluent country like Australia to point this out, Lithuanians might simply have to accept that there is rarely gain without pain. Reducing corruption in the country will be one clear sign that, after various false starts over the past decade, Lithuania is now consolidating its new system.

Leslie Holmes has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Melbourne since 1988, and was until July 2000 Director of its Contemporary Europe Research Centre. He is the sole author of four books (including a 1993 book on the role of corruption in the collapse of communism), and editor or co-editor of a further four. He is currently in Europe finishing a book on corruption in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

Sources Cited

Letters to the Editor

European Union
I have been wondering whether Lithuania’s culture would be threatened by joining the European Union (EU). Many English are very concerned about this kind of danger. Having beaten the Russians, the Lithuanians would now be regulated by a German/French/British dominated organisation. Is that what they want?
Norway and Iceland are not members and aren’t interested in joining, from what I can gather.

Robert S. WATERWORTH, Perth, W.A.

Interesting, fascinating

Thank you for your most interesting Lithuanian Papers. I was in Vilnius recently for our University and I am not the first to have fallen under the spell of that beautiful city. At Easter, I was introduced to members of your community at Victoria University of Technology in Melbourne. It was fascinating to be with them and to hear of Lithuanian culture in Australia.
We are having the Australian Literature (EASA) conference here in 2001 (September 25 - 29). I hope, some of you can be present.

(Prof.) Bernard HICKEY, Universita degli studi di Lecce (Italy).

* The Editor welcomes letters, especially brief ones, at PO Box 777, Sandy Bay, Tasmania, 7006, and reserves the right to condense.
The Poetry of Janina Degutytė
Translated by Gražina SLAVENAS

Janina Degutytė (1928-1990) was a leading Lithuanian lyric poet of her time. Behind Degutytė's deceptive simplicity of form and language lie layers of personal and symbolic meaning which speak directly to the hearts and souls of her readers. Degutytė published a total of 19 books of poetry, including 10 collections of children's verses.

In retrospect, Degutytė emerges as an intensely committed poet whose quiet voice remains the voice of conscience for a nation which had no voice. - Degutytė's portrait (above) is by B. Jacevičiūtė (1959)

Gražina Slavenas, B.A., M.A. (Chicago), Ph.D. (SUNYAB) lives in Buffalo, N.Y. and teaches languages, writing, and literature. Her translations of Degutytė's poetry have been published widely in anthologies and literary magazines in the U.K., USA and Lithuania.

The Pear Tree

In my father's orchard
a tall pear tree stands in bloom,
all-white, a mountain of snow.

And our gray house
embraces against the mountain
like a swallow's nest.

Under the old cracked roof,
we share our daily bread
and truth. The bread is warm
and the house is filled with light:
through one window flows the moon,
through the other the stars look in.

1966

Requiem for My Son

Under the huge rising sun
(round and cool as a palmtree
fruit on which it shines
is the dead head of my last son)
my blood is black as the night.

Under the huge thirsty sun
(it sucked up all the juices
of the earth and my sorrow, too)
my blood is black as night.

Under the huge murderous sun
(doomed by the gods I
have nothing more to lose)
my blood is black as night.

Under the huge dead sun
(long are the shadows of
dried-up riverbeds, -- who
will lead my people from them?)
my blood is as black as the night.

1971

Oedipus

And so you failed to escape...
Your eyes deceived you,
and your palms deceived you.
You didn't know that you were blind.
To see you had to lose your sight.
And now your shadow falls
on us all,
like the original sin,
and no one knows
who will be next.
Till Eulenspiegel

"The ashes are knocking at my door",
said Till Eulenspiegel.

When I drink the red wine,
when I break the rye, --
I think of you.

When I see rivers and clouds,
When my feet turn white from dust
and bitter my throat, --
I think of you
I think of you.

Flanders, your nights are bright--from bonfires.
Flanders, your winters are warm--from bonfires.
Your soil is gray--from ashes.

Every midnight
sings the bird of my unrest,
the ashes knock at my heart...

Ashes knock at my heart,
And I think of you,
when I drink the gray smoky sky,
when I eat the scorched black
threshold of my home...

Inquisitors, --
the hour of your last bonfire is near.

To the Sounds of Jazz

This nameless unrest
grows out of control.
And we run away from home in
thoughts or on trains and planes.

We spill into streets,
fill hotels and cafés,
set out on a raft all alone, --
to confront the seas.

We are blinded by numbers
and clever missiles,
deafened by amplified voices
and flutes in the moon, --
stunned and still,
we taste from a palm
the sharp seed of hemp.

Our spines are so soft...
We can’t hide behind
walls of steel and glass.
Spiral stairs wind up and down.

One day we shall meet our own selves.
We would like to be gods
on the First Day of the World.
1967

* Leeka Kraucevičius,
Jazz Singer, 1983, pastel 55 x 75 cm.
- From Dr. Genovaitė E. Kazokas’s PhD thesis,
University of Tasmania, 1992.
Lithuanian Honours Scholarship

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More information?
Contact Mr Al Taskunas from the Lithuanian Studies Society on: (03) 6226 2541 or (03) 6225 2505 or write to: PO Box 777, Sandy Bay, 7006 or Tasmania Scholarships Office in Reception area of the Administration Building, Hobart ph (03) 6226 2879

The Family Business:
Jagiellonian Lithuania-Poland
S.C. ROWELL
Lithuanian Institute of History, Vilnius

Between 1387 and 1572 four generations of Jagiellonians ruled the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. Their reputation in both of their realms remains ambiguous - from the exotic to the alien. Although the "age of the Jagiellonians" is acknowledged as "golden" by most Polish scholars, the "golden age" seems to have very little to do with the dynasty's aims and achievements. Lithuanian writers can claim that "Casimir ended the dynasty's history: Gediminians became Jagiellonians" (and hence alien).

Both points of view stem from fifteenth-century political pretensions on the part of the Little Polish nobility which scholars in both parts of the Commonwealth's territory continue either in favour of the Polish Crown or against it. The opinion of the Krakow chronicler and royal tutor Długosz and his patron Bishop Oleśnicki, to wit that Jogaila and his sons were graciously created by the (Little-) Polish nobility and had no rights, dominates Polish scholarship to this day despite the evidence to the contrary, that Jogaila and his sons were true heirs and natural lords, which Długosz himself records from, or places into the mouth of the same Bishop. Lithuanian writers have taken on this prejudice since the nineteenth century. The election of Casimir as king of Poland in 1445-47 provides an excellent example of a dynasty's political gambling the aim of which was to show clearly what his rights were as Jogaila's sole surviving heir and force the Little-Polish nobility to recognise him as the only viable candidate.¹

The university sermon of welcome delivered by Jan of Ludzisko, a doctor of medicine, in June 1447 when Casimir arrived in Krakow

¹ S.C. Rowell, 'Casimir Jagiellonczyk and the Polish gamble, 1445-47', Lithuanian Historical Studies IV (1999), 7-39
for his coronation is a neo-classic jewel. He speaks of the young ruler as: “ex patricia et ducum Lythwanorum familia effulsit, que tot seculis ornatissimae ymagines consulares pretorias triumphales ducta, in hunc diem potens illustrisque perdurat”. Lithuania is proclaimed to be prominent in virtue, strength and fortune, qualities which are connected directly with the rule of this dynasty. Few can rival the Jagiellonians in age and glory, claims Jan. Casimir is praised for his justice, diligence, faith and integrity - the qualities praised by the Archbishop of Gniezno in a sermon the following month - as young ruler of Lithuania. Jan hopes that he will foster similar virtues in Poland.

In a sermon delivered before Casimir by the Polish primate in August 1447, approximately two weeks before the post-coronation Piotrków sejm, we find a long discussion of what a good ruler should be. The king’s task is to govern, judge and provide peace; he is like the sun, “dux planetarum”, which holds centre place among other planets. He should be like the king of the bees or Julius Caesar; a Polish model is Boleslaw Krzywousty. The king should defend the church, and like the lion not devour women and the fallen (unless hungry).

The example of Robert II of France, chided on his death bed by Bishop Ignatius of Paris for not controlling the rapacity of his servants is presented as how one should respond to mistreatment of the poor at the hands of royal administrators. Good rule (regimen rei publice) depends on administration of the law and the obedience of subjects to their king. Laws should govern everyone, as Scripture and the Gospels teach. A long passage is devoted to the question of who should provide counsel for a king for ‘rex debet esse facilis ad credendum maturo et sapienti consilio’: from the wise and not from sycophants, for advice should be free from wrath and desire,

“ut imitetur David regem in humilitate, Salomonem in sapiencia, Jonathan in bellorum constancia, Ezechiam in sanctitate, Manassesen in penitencia, Isaiam in religiositate, Constantinium in ecclesie sublimacione, Velentinianum in ecclesie defensione, Wladislaum patrem tuum in infidelium conversione, fratre tuum filium eius in infidelium teucrorum deliberatione”.

The model propounded here by Archbishop Wincenty is an answer to the Crown’s problems: justice, defence of the realm, protection of the church, control of abuses on the part of officials, attention to good counsel. For Jan of Ludzisko Casimir was a scion of a noble ruling house, who had shown his ability to govern Lithuania. He is expected to defend Poland, his other paternal inheritance and protect the afflicted. The university sermon does not seek to argue Casimir’s submission to the local nobility.

Paternal inheritance, the family property, seems to be the key to understanding the basic mechanisms of the Jagiellonian monarchy and it is the rights endowed by property to various social groups which forms the main dynamic of fifteenth-century Polish and

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3 Ibid. fo.200
Lithuanian political life: competition between the dynasty and the nobility, first of Poland and soon of the Grand Duchy too.

The so-called Acts of Union collected by modern scholars - most efficiently by Kutrzeba and Semkowicz, provide an excellent indicator of this patently obvious but for some reason almost always undervalued or ignored dynastic essence of the Union. Confusion is further increased by the fact that similar expressions of homage from Polish communities and personages are not included in the collection.

The document surviving from Jogaila's negotiation summary in Kreva in August 1385 make this clear: first and foremost he will be king by marriage (to one heiress), adoption (by the chief heiress, his future wife's mother) and election. This clause is the only detail missing from Dlugosz's account of negotiations because it is not a detail, heredity, that the Olesnicki junta wish to recognise.

Dlugosz's selective memory was used by the Chicago lawyer, Jonas Dainauskas, to produce quite the most ludicrous book on these events which has appeared anywhere. It is significant that Jogaila continually presses his dynastic rights while the Krakow nobility refer to him as "tutor regni" before his coronation, rather than "heres", a distinction they relinquish in the case of his sons and heirs, Wladyslaw and Casimir.

In 1401 when Jadwiga of Anjou was dead and Jogaila needed to reassert his and his heiress's position in both his realms, Jogaila sought to obtain ratification - hence the so-called "Union of Vilnius-Radom" and his gamble with Vytautas (who was not condemned to die without male issue before Jogaila). The Horodlo Act of 1413 is more like a genuine "interstate" agreement in so far as it is a pseudo-dynastic alliance between the nobility of Lithuania and Poland under the protection of Jogaila and Vytautas. The inclusion of a wide section of Polish and Lithuanian "political society" in this agreement is probably why it is the "union document" which is so frequently cited in later negotiations.

When Casimir was sent to Vilnius and installed as grand duke he was not breaking the union but stretching it. He had been sent with the permission of Wladyslaw his brother and the Polish nobility; when he was proclaimed grand duke by the Lithuanians his brother reverted to the "supreme duke" tactic. When Wladyslaw was slain at Warna, Casimir sought to make clear his position in both his inheritances. The "act of union" was his coronation as king. No document was issued apart from a charter for Lithuania (now that his status was changing) and a practical agreement with the Poles - to allow him to travel he please and use the services of whomsoever he please irrespective of origin. He makes a post-coronation statement which he maintains throughout, despite attacks on his life and the difficulties of administering two troubled and ambitious realms - Casimiro regnante there will be no separate grand duke. Despite the wheedling of both Polish and Lithuanian scholars about absentee lordship, Casimir spent almost half his reign in each dominion, albeit not in annual balance. One might argue that it is the fact that since 1572 Poland and Lithuania have lacked a royal family whose position is based on heredity that modern Republican scholars find it impossible to take agreements made by hereditary monarchs of a composite state political acts.

In 1453, it seems to me, a year after his most serious dynastic rivals, Mykolas Žygimantas and Švitrigaila had died, in the wake of their deaths Casimir was able to come to terms with both polities and ensure the continued existence of the union, thereby resuscitating Jogaila's "political society" and the foundation of the Lithuanian state as it is today.

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Footnote:

Rowell, "Casimir", 30-31; idem, "1446 and all that" (forthcoming)
of serious outbreaks of violence in both the Grand Duchy and the Crown and on the eve of his personal union with Elisabeth of Austria, he issued a declaration which illustrates his view: that he has united both realms, that Lithuania can have the southern lands she disputes with Poland so long as she keeps the status quo intact and that a general sejm should be held annually one year in Poland, the other in Lithuania. Around the time he makes this declaration he confirmed Polish charters at long last after six years of dodging the issue and recognised his mother’s rights to lands bestowed to her by Jogaila (thereby keeping the Lithuanian dynastic cat safely in the midst of the Krakow pigeons).

Casimir’s reaction to these claims of rights to rule is to multiply the number of possessions for his sons by seeking new kingdoms for his heirs in traditional Gediminid style, while multiplying the number of administrators of royal-grand-ducal government in Poland and the Grand Duchy. Thus, he patronises the nobility of

* The Lithuanian-Polish diet, or sejm (above) evolved further and became stronger during Casimir’s rule. Sketch based on an 16th century engraving

competing regions (in the Crown, especially where Little and Greater Poland are concerned) and attempts to dilute power structures within regions as when he grants the queen mother, Sonka, confirmation of her landholdings presented to her in Poland by Jogaila. He distributes land widely to boiars to avoid magnate formation, and seeks to make use of the sejm, the nascent institution of political representation. Restrictions on disposal of lands illustrates the theoretical difference between the grand duke’s land-based power and that of his nobles. The fact that developments did not match Casimir’s intentions and his noble creations turned out to be Frankenstein’s monsters (the sixteenth-century Polish and Lithuanian magnates) should not lead us to underestimate his (and his family’s) skill.

Dr. S. C. ROWELL is a Senior Research Officer at the Lithuanian Institute of History, Vilnius. He is the author of "Lithuania Ascending. a pagan empire in east-central Europe 1295-1345" (Cambridge,1994). He is currently working on a study of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under Casimir Jagiellonczyk and is preparing modern editions of historical documents related to Lithuanian history in the 13th-15th centuries (under auspices of the Millennium Commission of the Lithuanian President’s Office).

Addendum: Internet in Lithuania

Amanda Banks’s internet directory (Surfing in Lithuania) was greeted with great enthusiasm by our readers everywhere, when the 4-page list was published in last year’s Lithuanian Papers We are always glad to update previous data and to print new addresses. The following additions have since been received:

The University of Šiauliai
http://www.su.lt

10th World Lithuanian Youth Congress (X PLJK)

Congress Internet website
A Lithuanian Management Scholar

Through the ages, Lithuanian scholars have made significant contributions to many branches of knowledge. Unfortunately, some of their identities have been lost in the mists of history.

Andrius Vytautas Graičiūnas, a Lithuanian management expert (pictured), is often described as a Romanian or a Frenchman. Graičiūnas is best known for his writings on the span of control in management.

Graičiūnas studied human relationships within a given span of relationships. He revealed, for example, that increasing the number of subordinates from 11 to 12 resulted in 13334 new relationships. Graičiūnas's theories recognized that management had to deal not only with a variety of individual personalities, but also with different combinations of individuals or "group personalities".

Andrius Graičiūnas (also known as Greičiūnas and Graicunas) was born of Lithuanian parents in Chicago, Illinois on August 17, 1898. After studies at Grenoble university and Armour IT, he graduated in Mechanical Engineering in 1923. Graičiūnas worked as a consultant in the organisation of factories and firms in the United States of America, Switzerland, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In 1935, he came to Lithuania and was employed as a management consultant to the Lithuanian Air Force, government departments, the National Theatre and the Lithuanian Film Corporation. Graičiūnas established the Scientific Management Society in Kaunas and was its inaugural president.

During the Russian and German occupations, Graičiūnas remained in Lithuania and worked as a senior engineer and, from 1945, as Associate Professor at Vytautas Magnus University. The Soviets arrested Graičiūnas in 1951, charged him with anti-Soviet activities and sentenced him to 8 years in exile. In 1952, unable to bear the conditions in his concentration camp, Graičiūnas committed suicide. Algimantas P. TAŠKŪNAS.

Acknowledgements: Profs B. Martinkus and Tadas Toločka, of KTU.

Homo Sovieticus and Post-Soviet Lithuania

Alexandra ASHBOURNE
Centre for European Reform, London

'What goals can a worm have when it's attached to a hook'

Fifty years of Soviet Occupation left an indelible stain on the Lithuanian psyche. The imposition of an alien bureaucratic structure grafted (unwillingly and unknowingly) the mentality of homo sovieticus, on to the Lithuanian population. It affected every aspect of Lithuanian life, but this only became obvious as Lithuania re-emerged as an independent state. The essential political, economic, industrial and social reforms implemented since the restitution of independence were all influenced by the existence of homo sovieticus. It is therefore necessary to determine how this phenomenon evolved and to identify its principal characteristics which have influenced generations of Lithuanian people.

The influence of homo sovieticus is remarkable because Lithuania has a distinct national identity, nationhood and culture, which sustained her throughout centuries of occupation. A homogeneous population, a common language and a common culture within defined ethnographic boundaries is unusual in Central and Eastern Europe, which traditionally has an extremely multi-national population.

In 1910, Marija Pečkauskaite, a noted author of the time, characterised the Lithuanian soul as follows: 'Like the Lithuanian landscape, in which there are no cloud-scraping mountains, no awesome abysses, no broad endless plains, no powerful rivers which defy all barriers. The landscape of Lithuania expresses peacefulness and moderation. The Lithuanian character is the same. There is no violence, no excess of desire, no false pose in it. The Lithuanian feels deeply but quietly. He rejoices and weeps, loves and hates, but without show. There is much of resignation in his

1 Zinoviev, A. Homo Sovieticus Victor Gollancz, 1985, p196
outlook on life.' To examine this soul with the already identified sense of nationhood created a distinct homo lituanicus.

To examine the effect, therefore, of homo sovieticus on homo lituanicus and on Lithuania, one must first define it. The term was used officially to describe Soviet people en masse. A definition of the ideal Soviet person was produced by the Communist Party of the USSR, but homo sovieticus in theory and homo sovieticus in reality were totally dissimilar. According to the Programma Kommunisticheskoj Partii of 1986, the Soviet citizen possessed ‘the all-round developed personality which combines spiritual richness, moral purity and physical perfection.’ But the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, was aware that this species of homo sovieticus was only a myth. He accused the Soviet people of absenteeism, pilfering, alcoholism, lying and many other flaws.

The homo sovieticus currently found in Lithuania bears many of these shortcomings. But homo sovieticus is not a uniform being and its various properties emerge in different strata of Lithuanian society. The implementation of Communism cemented firm social divisions within Soviet Lithuania: the people were inextricably divided between the higher echelons of the Party faithful: the Nomenklatura, and the rest of the population: the proletariat and peasants.

The Nomenklatura rose to power through connections rather than merit. Membership was an automatic passport to an escape from the petty difficulties inherent in Soviet daily life. The Nomenklatura were entitled to, among other things, spacious apartments, access to restricted shops and special medical facilities. They were members of the Communist Party of Lithuania, which changed its name in 1990 to the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. This name change, however, was only a cosmetic alteration: the elite of the Party re-elected to office in 1992 were, with few exceptions, those who had occupied that role during the years of Soviet Occupation. Peter Bod,

Hungarian Trade Minister between 1992-1994, attributed the success of the former Communist regimes which were re-elected throughout Central and Eastern Europe to the existence of the Nomenklatura. ‘They all knew each other...had gone to University together...and were able to present a cohesive body to the electorate as opposed to the fragmented “independence” parties.’

The Lithuanian Nomenklatura were not, however, united when it came to devising the necessary reforms following the restitution of independence. Instead, there were two separate groups: advocates of reform, because they were well-placed to benefit from it; versus those vehemently opposed to change, because it would mean losing their status and power. By hindering reform, this ilk of homo sovieticus was most damaging to Lithuania’s development in the years following independence.


Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii 1986 p133

It is more difficult to define precisely the facets of *homo sovieticus* apparent in the lower stratum of Lithuanian society – the majority of the population. There are three distinct varieties of *homo sovieticus*: the “sheep”, those who displayed no individuality and demonstrated a complete lack of initiative; the “believers”, who saw no evil in the Soviet regime and were unable to usefully criticise or, again, to show initiative. These were complemented by a third: those with an excess of initiative – they appeared to go about their regular work, but paid it only superficial attention, while conducting their own activities in somebody else’s time and at somebody else’s cost. This was a form of internal exile (see below).

The failure of the Soviet system led to the evolution of this third variety of *homo sovieticus*, best defined by Vladimir Shlapentokh: ‘with the strong deviation of real Soviet life from the official model, the Soviet people have developed a mentality that allows them to ignore public interests and to absorb themselves in private or illegal activity in the workplace while preserving a surface allegiance to the Soviet system.’ This branch of *homo sovieticus* obstructed the development of Lithuania in the post-Soviet years, because it was so used to working for purely personal gain that it could not be relied upon collectively to restart the national economy.

The above attributes comprise the character of *homo sovieticus*, found not just in Lithuania, but throughout the former Soviet bloc. The term *homo sovieticus* describes a variety of greatly differing individuals borne from the same circumstance. But why did Soviet society produce such a phenomenon? To examine the origins of *homo sovieticus*, one must look briefly at the characteristics of a bureaucratic society.

Max Weber, in his detailed study of bureaucracy, emphasised that in a bureaucratic society, a great amount of discipline was exerted by a chosen few to ensure critical and unresisting mass obedience. Weber underlined the importance of ‘domination through knowledge’—decisions taken by an ‘elite stratum of professionally trained individuals, who carry out their specialised functions in a strictly detached and rule-bound fashion.’ Thus Weber’s bureaucratic society would be dominated by a strong leader, supported by a network of bureaucrats – the centralisation of authority. Fundamental traits of Weber’s bureaucratic theory resurfaced in the Soviet system which developed after the 1917 Revolution and influenced Soviet (and Lithuanian) society. These were the innate sense of authority and superiority, the dislike of responsibility, the hierarchical spirit and the resentment displayed towards reform. This contributed to the evolution of *homo sovieticus*.

But why did so many Lithuanians conform to a regime which blatantly contradicted their ideals? Why could *homo sovieticus* evolve in Lithuania? Principally because the natural, human instinct for self-preservation often dominates during an occupation. There are, of course, people who cast aside this instinct: some, such as Romas Kalanta of Lithuania, martyred themselves in the name of nationalism. Others, like Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, suffered arrest and imprisonment in defence of their ideals. And there were many people whose names are unrecognisable to few but their immediate families, but who were brave enough to stand up for their beliefs and paid the penalty.

Most people, however, lack this courage. Desire for self-preservation traditionally fosters conformity, albeit for the most part only on the surface. Many people therefore retreat into internal exile in order to survive. Internal exile means paying lip-service to the regime in power, while sharing one’s real thoughts only with those who are entirely trustworthy – a natural reaction to living in a society riddled with informers.

Internal exile is only possible with the hope that eventually the situation will improve. Such faith has historically sustained people


7 Ibid.
in this situation. Conforming was the easiest way of living in a society which made everything difficult: working, eating and even recreation. This feeling was cultivated by the ruling elite who felt that individuals were better suited to mass manipulation if they were otherwise occupied with struggling to fulfil the most basic daily chores. The Communist Governments of Eastern and Central Europe may even have deliberately encouraged these difficulties to demoralise and de-personalise the state, for the creation of individual persons was the complete antithesis of Communism.

Internal exile was particularly rife in the workplace. Little care was given to work, partly because of the lack of pride in something for which no direct benefit would be received, but also because of the wish to conform in a society of mass apathy. It was in the workplace that the proliferation of a population made up of homo sovieticus in internal exile had its most dramatic impact. With only token allegiance paid to the regime, economic stagnation and a decline and slackening of technological progress became inevitable as increasing amounts of attention focused on the “second” economy.

Those in internal exile in Soviet Lithuania were sustained by literature, such as samizdat publications, like the Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania. Culture was also a valuable source, as it could sometimes escape suppression by the Soviet authorities. Music was particularly important. The works of Lithuanian composer Ciurlionis, for example, were performed throughout the Soviet Occupation. But Ciurlionis had been a staunch Lithuanian nationalist and during the Occupation his music was a reminder of Lithuania’s individual national identity.

The determination to maintain the Lithuanian language was one of the more obvious manifestations of a population in internal exile. Although the authorities emphasised the use of Russian, this had happened before in Lithuania’s history and her people were geared to protecting their language and ensuring its survival. Although Russian was used in business circles, little attempt was made to speak it at home. The preservation of Lithuania’s national identity,
Child’s Gate to Learning
Ramunė KUBILIUS
Northwestern University, Chicago

In a 1998 Lituanus article, Rev. William Wolkovich-Valkavičius wrote that the first significant expression from the American diaspora took shape in the early 1880s, through the transmission of contraband publications and the start of sales of booklets from Prussia. After these efforts, support flowed during the tsarist regime, the interwar independence period, the years of Soviet occupation, and continue to this day. Wolkovich-Valkavičius concludes: “The fact remains that a sturdy, underlying humanitarian impulse continues to link Lithuanians and their descendents to the land of their forebears” (1)

Humanitarian aid motives inspired a grassroots group, the Chicago, IL based Child’s Gate to Learning. In 1997, current and retired teachers and other professionals, with Rita Wenzlow (Venclovas) at the forefront, were affected by a number of papers read at the Lithuanian Symposium on Arts and Sciences. The papers gave horrifying statistics, by some accounts estimated in the tens of thousands, of underage children from asocial families in Lithuania who are regularly truant from school. The women felt that lack of education and aimless street lives of thousands of children did not bode well for Lithuania’s future. Initial plans to write a petition to the Ministry of Education of Lithuania were replaced by proactive measures that ensured better results.

Soon after the symposium, the women sought ideas for action from Lithuanian Americans who had worked with young people in Lithuania and met with Sister Daiva Kuzmickas, a social worker and doctoral student studying in the United States. She and members of her order, the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception, had experience encouraging Lithuania’s street children to return to school. Their after-school centres for children aged 6-17 years provided a clean safe haven to counter the children’s difficult home lives.

From the beginning, the Child’s Gate to Learning founders made some decisions about the group’s initiatives. The group in Chicago, then partner groups in Cleveland and Detroit, selected to support a few shelters led by religious and teachers in Vilnius and a few villages. Membership fees, school and sports supply donations were collected from the membership base of nearly 70.

Correspondence was regularly maintained with coordinators at the supported shelters. Fund-raising included Christmas bazaar cake sales, a Halloween luncheon for Chicago area Lithuanian families, and a forthcoming picnic. The group became an independent unit of the Lithuanian Human Services Council of the USA, so donations would be tax-deductible. When it was decided to seek American foundation grant support, a board of directors was formed and a program developed: Lithuanian Educational Advancement Project.

The group in Chicago developed modules (games and exercises) for the after-school shelters that help foster team building and support the development of values such as friendship, generosity, tolerance. As of June 2000, three Child’s Gate members will spend a year in Lithuania working with two Vilnius shelters in seeing L.E.A.P. come to fruition.
Meanwhile, in Lithuania, the government still is not formally recognizing the problem, but a few private foreign charitable donations have reached some of the shelters. Also, university students and local volunteers have been recruited to work with the children on arts and crafts projects, sports activities, and small community projects. A quote of Mother Teresa attests: "To keep a lamp burning we have to keep putting oil in it". Child’s Gate to Learning is trying to ensure that the oil in the lamp keeps being replenished. (2)

Ramune Kubilius, BS, MALS, is a medical librarian by profession. She has been active in a number of organizations and has served on the Executive Council (Krašto valdyba) and on the Educational Council of Lithuanian-American Community Inc. She became involved in Child’s Gate to Learning about a year after its founding.

Footnotes
(2) For more information on Child’s Gate to Learning; you may E-mail <r-kubilius@northwestern.edu>

* In the Angel of Hope centre, the young visitors are planning the celebration of Christmas. The Child’s Gate to Learning character-building programme started in September, 2000. Photo: CGL.

Revenge
Vidmantas ELMIŠKIS
Kaunas

The man in the flat above me has a most infuriating habit. He exercises each morning. No, he doesn’t thump his bar-bells down on the floor, or do the cross-country through his rooms. Something much worse. This he-man does chin-ups hanging over the railing of his balcony, and what I get is a view of his bare feet going up and down, up and down, up and down.

So what?, you might say. Just pay no attention. Feet up, feet down, feet up, feet down....

But fair’s fair. Before intruding on a neighbour’s private space, it might have been worth enquiring whether he finds the sight of hairy, bandy legs attractive or not. Hell, never mind those calves. Perhaps I’ve just had a life-long antipathy to exercise; perhaps that’s what’s making me fragment in fury at this jerking about?

I’ve got to calm down. After all, the fellow isn’t shaking his scatter rugs down on me; no water seeps through my ceiling from his overflows; he doesn’t have heavy metal music on at night. It’s just great that he is full of health, life and energy and acquits himself wonderfully at work. Close the eyes, don’t look, don’t see.

Those bare feet go up and down, up and down... Thunder and lightning!

I’m not jealous of my neighbour’s mighty biceps and wide shoulders. I’m no neurotic - at least I wasn’t before all this.

And the feet go up and down, up and down...

"Hey!", I shout. "Hey, you!"

In the Angel of Hope centre, the young visitors are planning the celebration of Christmas. The Child’s Gate to Learning character-building programme started in September, 2000. Photo: CGL.
The feet still. And hang there, swaying like branches in the wind. "Why don’t you put in a bar up on your own balcony? It’s those - How shall I put it? - those feet of yours!"

"They’re clean."

"Don’t you play the fool with me!

"With all due respect, I’ll do what I like in my own flat." "Your own flat?" So angry I could have choked. "And what’s this then?" jabbing his soles with my index finger, "Eh?" "You’re crazy!" His feet jerked back. "Dinosaur!"

Fair enough. I’m going to fill a basin with boiling water and hold it up at a certain height. I’ll bet he changes his tune then! Or maybe he won’t. I bet he’s ticklish. I’ll get a goose feather and make a few passes at his armpits! Full stop. There wouldn’t be a shred of evidence. And I’d have blessed peace. The only thing is ... those pangs of conscience.

But then the idea suddenly hits me. It is truly a cold, hard fact that the big things are mind-blowing in their simplicity. I wish you could see my face as I walk across my room on my hands for the first time! I swear, the day when I can do this along my balcony railing isn’t too distant. Then the charming soles of my feet will rise up under my neighbour’s very nose like an extraordinary flower from below!

Can’t help thinking we’re just like gladiators, really: this is your neighbour, thirsting for revenge and wishing you good health, my friend.

Translated by Regina KRUTULYTIÈ-SHARE.

Vidmantas Elmièkis is a contemporary Lithuanian humorist and journalist. The above story was translated from his book, "Ir višta - paukštris" [The chook is a bird, too] (Nemunas/Kaunas, 1995).

Regina Krutulytiè-Share, B.A., Dip.Ed. (Tas.) is a Tasmanian-based language teacher who spent a great part of the nineties in Lithuania teaching, translating and editing.

Illustrations by Andrius Cvirka/ Šuota (p.59) and V. Beresniovas (p.60).

Sergei Kovalev said, “Sorry”...

Former Russian human rights activist, and now Russian State Duma deputy, Sergei Kovalev (pictured, right) told an international gathering in Vilnius on June 12 this year, "It was my nation that tolerated Communism, it was my nation that was fascinated with the idea of Communism and welcomed it, and occupied the Baltic countries, and not only them. I would like to stress that, although the main culprits are the Communists, we [Russians] cannot say either that we had nothing to do with it all. Please accept my apologies."

Kovalev addressed delegates from 21 countries who had gathered in Lithuania's capital to assess the crimes of Communism. After 3 days' intensive discussions, a nine-member international tribunal was formed to provide a social, political and legal evaluation of Communism. Russian dissident Yelena Bonner and former Polish President Lech Walesa were among those present at this congress.

... and the Pope Honoured Martyrs

During a May 7 ceremony in the Roman Colosseum, Pope John Paul II honoured thousands of 20th century martyrs, including 114 Lithuanians.

The Colosseum is a symbol of early Christian martyrdom. The modern martyrs had died at the hands of Soviet totalitarianism, Nazism and Fascism. Others were missionaries in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Oceania; some were persecuted ‘out of hatred for the Catholic faith’.

Unfortunately, the list of 114 Lithuanian victims was incomplete. Many other Lithuanian martyrs' names were omitted, because their cases could not be fully documented in time, to meet the deadline set by the organisers of the ceremony.
In Brief

* The Lithuanian World Community held its Tenth PLB Seimas (General Assembly) in Vilnius on August 15 - 20 this year. 129 elected delegates attended from 28 countries. The gathering discussed many current issues, including Lithuania and NATO, joining EU, Lithuanians in Poland, education, youth, culture, the forthcoming commemoration of mass deportations etc. Mr Vytautas Kamantas was re-elected Chairman of the Lithuanian World Community for the next three years, 2000-2003. - PLB.

* Preparation of the 20th - and final - volume of the Great Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language is reaching completion in the Institute of the Lithuanian Language in Vilnius. It is due to be published in 2002, to coincide with the centenary of the dictionary’s inception. Work on the Great Dictionary is believed to have begun in 1902, when the future Lithuanian linguist, Kazimieras Būga, then still a student, began writing down Lithuanian words on little cards. The data base of the Great Dictionary of the Lithuanian Language now consists of 4.5 million individual cards. Researchers are worried that the cards are not stored in fireproof safes, only in filing cabinets left over from the time of the first Lithuanian Republic (1918-1940). - Transl. Gintautas Kaminskas.

* For a full month, from June 4 to July 4, 2000, the people of Vilnius enjoyed Vilnius Festival 2000, sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Vilnius Festival is a full member of the Association of European Festivals which runs more than 60 renowned festivals (Athens, Bregenz, Gstaad, Edinburgh, Prague and others). The festival’s long-term objectives - promotion of Lithuanian performing arts and joint projects with foreign performers. - Simon Taškūnas.

* The United States closed its foreign aid mission in Lithuania at the end of March this year. By July, similar missions in all eight formerly Communist countries in the area were closed. Over 10 years, Lithuania had received about $80 million in U.S. assistance. Included were programs to support civil society and the promotion of a market economy.

Developing Quality Management in Lithuanian Industry and Commerce

Barry FISHER, Loughborough University, U.K.
Dalius SERAFINAS, Kaunas University of Agriculture

During the 10 years since independence in 1990, Lithuania’s economy has been transformed from a planned to a market economy. This transformation has been helped considerably by technical assistance programmes, especially to ensure that the economy will be able to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces that will come with full accession to the European Union (EU).

A key priority of these programmes has been the development of modern quality management practices throughout Lithuanian industry and commerce. Quality means consistently satisfying the requirements of customers and regulatory bodies. High quality products (and services) are fundamental to the success of competitive market economies. Regulatory requirements are particularly significant, such as the product safety requirements contained in many EU directives, and so independent certification and surveillance must be used to ensure supplied products conform to national and EU regulations.

The development of quality management practices in Lithuanian industry and commerce since independence can be discussed under two broad headings. The first concerns the initial work to apply quality management fundamentals and implement ISO 9000 quality management systems. The second concerns the more recent developments to implement total quality management, or business excellence, and the influence of Lithuanian management culture on these developments. Since Lithuania is in the process of becoming a member of the EU, this paper compares Lithuanian quality management practices with those of Western companies.

Implementation of quality management systems

Companies throughout the world, operate quality management systems that meet the requirements of the ISO 9000 standards.
ISO 9000 Standards

The ISO 9000 standards are international standards for quality assurance used by companies and organizations throughout the world. The standards specify a generic set of requirements whose purpose is to prevent errors and mistakes during company operation, thus making sure that every customer receives what was agreed at the outset.

The requirements are implemented as work activities, such as reviewing, approving, testing and checking. Collectively these activities make up a quality system. The ISO 9000 standards also require companies to continuously improve their operational performance.

In Western economies, implementing an ISO 9000 quality management system is generally recognised as the first main step a company takes as it sets off along the road of developing a culture of total quality management.

Of course, the concept of a ‘quality system’ is not new to Lithuanian companies. In many companies some aspects of a quality system were already in place because of the previous Soviet (Russian) system of GOST standards. These standards formed the basis of the documentation for Lithuanian quality systems. However, this previous State approach was for the ‘policing’ of quality control and inspection, requiring conformity to governmental targets. Each GOST standard had a heading “The non-fulfilment of requirements is prosecuted by the law”. Consequently, this approach has made it difficult for Lithuanian workforces to comprehend the ‘voluntary’ quality assurance concepts required for Western market economies. Quality is still something that Lithuanian companies understand as inspection and control, rather than assurance and the need to satisfy the requirements of markets and customers. Frequently, rather than investigating and solving problems, workers say, “We do not have nor create problems in our department; the problems appear from somewhere else”.

The specific and directive approach of GOST standards has also made it difficult for Lithuanian workers to interpret the general way in which the ISO 9000 standards specify quality requirements. Companies have to decide for themselves how to implement the requirements. Previously, Soviet management policies and procedures were written to last for many years. Changing any document involved lengthy bureaucratic procedures, and many policy statements were not followed or acted upon. In contrast, ISO 9000 requires a company to have up-to-date written statements of management policies, clearly supported by the actions of senior managers, and documents that describe current operating procedures.

The changes brought about by the technical assistance programmes during the last four or five years are steadily overcoming these problems. Lithuanian professionals who specialise in quality management now provide training, consultancy and expert advice. Over ten consultancy companies in the major towns of Lithuania, together with the Kaunas University of Technology, offer training and consultancy services in quality management. Almost all the ISO 9000 standards and guidelines have been translated into Lithuanian and approved as national standards.

Also during the last four or five years, many Lithuanian companies have developed the expertise to implement ISO 9000 quality systems and write the required documentation in Lithuanian. Exposure

* Outside the Agri-Business Training Centre in Vilnius. From left: Ervydas Juodžiūs (Lithuanian Food Institute, Kaunas), Dr Barry Fisher (Loughborough University, UK), Dalius Serafinas (Lith. University of Agriculture, Kaunas), Dr Elena Kazlauskaite (Lith. Food Institute, Kaunas), Aloyzas Mikys (Bureau Veritas Quality Int'l, Vilnius), John Mills (UK consultant and PHARE project director, Agri-Business Training Centre, Vilnius)
to Russian inevitably weakened the skills of Lithuanians in the use of their language, as well as the development of the language itself, but nevertheless satisfactory business and technical documentation is being written in Lithuania today. Quality management documentation is written in Lithuanian, but key documents such as the policy manuals are translated into English for the purposes of independent assessment by assessors from either the UK or other EU countries.

Presently, ninety-nine companies in Lithuania are now operating to independently-certified ISO 9000 quality management systems (at the end of May 2000). This includes roughly equal numbers of production and service companies, although the trend is for more service companies to become ISO 9000 certified.

Certification services have been provided by 1 Lithuanian and 11 international certification bodies. Bureau Veritas Quality International (BVQI) has the largest market share of 40% and is the only international certification body with a permanent office in Lithuania, in Vilnius. Other ISO 9000 certification bodies used by Lithuanian companies have been from Germany, Holland, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and other countries.

The Lithuanian certification body LST-Sert was formed in 1999 through funding from the EU’s PHARE PRAQ-III programme. Expertise in quality system assessment is developing in Lithuania, and more and more certification is being done by Lithuanian experts. At the moment LST-Sert is part of the Lithuanian government’s Standardisation Department, in Vilnius. It is working in partnership with a Dutch certification body, but in the near future will become a private certification company.

**Total quality management and Lithuania**

In general in today’s European markets, an ISO 9000 quality system is regarded only as a necessary entry qualification to trade. Companies that compete successfully and prosper commercially work closely with their customers and continuously improve their performance in response to changes taking place in the market place. These principles are embedded in the concept of total quality management (TQM) or business excellence.

It is in this area that Lithuanian companies still have to make substantial progress compared with other European companies. Implementing total quality management is a major long-term challenge for any organisation. It has far-reaching implications for management style and organisation culture, such as leadership, working in teams and the use of open systems of communication. TQM emphasises the need for operation through a ‘pipeline’ of interlinked business processes, rather than ‘water-tight’ departments, and a culture of continuous improvement. This business process approach is so important that it is specified in the new ISO 9001:2000 standard as the basis of all future quality management systems.

By contrast, many Lithuanian companies retain the bureaucratic and hierarchical management structures from former Communist times, often with inefficient operating procedures. Many managers regard these multi-layered structures as the natural way of controlling company operation, which has the disadvantage of creating greater power distances between managers and workers. In Lithuanian companies when operations give rise to problems or customer complaints, the general practice still is to overrule operating procedures and issue written orders instead of examining the root causes of problems.Coupled with this weakness is the general lack of available resources and training for operators of plant and machinery. In contrast, Western practice increasingly is for companies to invest in the training of their workforces.

Nevertheless, Lithuanian companies are beginning to implement the principles of total quality management or business excellence. In 1996, though its National Quality Programme, the Lithuanian government has promoted ISO 9000 certification and instituted annual Lithuanian National Quality Prizes, for small, medium and large companies. In 1997, two Lithuanian assessors were trained in business excellence at the headquarters of the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) in Brussels, Belgium. In 1998, an extensive training programme in Lithuania trained 20 business-excellence assessors.
Companies that have applied for the national Quality Prize have shown significant progress along the road TQM. There are still some general areas of weakness, though, such as the directive approaches to management, rather than team-oriented, and the lack of effective prevention and continual improvement processes. Policy deployment, the translation of long-term policies into specific operational objectives and plans, is also an area of weakness.

The future development of quality management
Perhaps three main issues now face Lithuanian companies as they move towards widespread adoption of total quality management or business excellence. Firstly, managers and workforces must realise that ‘change’ is a natural state of affairs in modern business. They must understand how to manage this change. Secondly, managers and workforces must understand the operation of their companies in terms of business processes. The business process approach leads automatically to actions that place greater emphasis on customer satisfaction and monitoring, and measuring the performance of processes to enable continuous improvement. Thirdly, managers and workforces must realise that not all performance issues can be resolved through operational control. Achieving business results also requires well-motivated and well-trained employees who take responsibility and make good decisions. Total quality management or business excellence occurs when managers successfully blend all these factors together, thereby promoting commercial success.

Dr Barry Fisher is director of Loughborough University’s MBA programme in engineering management. As a registered quality management consultant, he has advised companies in Jordan, Lithuania and the UK. Currently he undertakes a wide range of engineering management postgraduate work and is particularly interested in areas linked to the achievement of business excellence. E-mail address: b.c.fisher@lboro.ac.uk

Dalius Serafinas is a research associate at the Lithuanian University of Agriculture. He has been a QMS (quality management systems) consultant since 1996 and a registered QMS auditor for BVQI since 1999. E-mail: dalius@tech.lzua.lt

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**Book Reviews**

**Recent Publications from VMU**

The study of Lithuanian history has intensified in the years since the country’s emergence from the rubble of the Soviet regime, and of course the number of books has multiplied. Given the problems of Lithuanians living abroad in finding out what new books have appeared in Vilnius, it is especially difficult to learn about books published outside of Vilnius. Hence the purpose of this article is to acquaint readers with some recent publications coming from the press of Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas.

The press published two significant historical works in the spring of 2000: Antanas Kulakauskas’s *Kova už valstiečių sielas* (The Struggle for the Peasants’ Souls), and Saulius Pivoras’s *Lietuvų ir latvių pilietinės savimones raida XVIII a. pabaiga - XIX a. pirmoji pusė: Lyginamasis aspektas* (The Development of Lithuanian and Latvian Civil Consciousness from the end of the 18th century to the first half of the 19th century: A Comparison).

Saulius Pivoras’s book, contrary to its title, involves the comparison of three national groups: Lithuanians, Latvians, and German nobility in the Baltic. A reader could perhaps find the book a useful, broad introduction to Kulakauskas’s more sharply focused study. (The book has a four-page English summary). Using a wealth of documentation - including memoirs, letters, belles lettres, folklore and even dictionaries - the author examines the characteristics of national consciousness among different social groups essentially on the eve of the abolition of serfdom.

Pivoras offers a fascinating variety of images: Lithuanian Russophobia, Latvian Russophilism, German loyalty to the tsarist regime. Serfdom, he argues, deeply affected the development of civil consciousness in the Baltic. Latvian peasants felt such antipathy for the German nobility that the development of the Latvian national consciousness identified with social grievances and gave rise to a mixture of “state patriarchalism and Russophilism.”
peasants, on the other hand, had a stronger sense of being part of a state tradition and felt stronger links with the Lithuanian nobility and displayed a greater inclination toward "social harmony and national consolidation."

Pivoras pays special attention to ideas of Latvian-Lithuanian cooperation. Lithuanians living in Riga, he declares, sought to establish links and ties, but Latvians did not respond. He identifies as a major cause of this failure "the differing evaluation of being a part of the Russian empire."

Antanas Kulakausas's study, which bears the subtitle Caro valdžia, Lietuvos visuomenė ir pradinis švietimas XIX a. viduryje (Tsarist Authority, Lithuanian Society, and Elementary Education in the Middle of the 19th Century), examines tsarist policies toward the teaching of Lithuanian in elementary schools in the decade before the ban on printing Lithuanian texts in Western characters.

Much has of course been written about the period of the ban, but Kulakauskas identifies a quite different governmental policy as having prevailed earlier. Recognizing that the modern world of the day required literate citizens, tsarist authorities in the 1850s and early 1860s favoured the teaching of Lithuanian and even discussed the possibility of relying on priests to do the teaching - priests, after all, constituted the main pool for finding competent teachers.

Could this policy have educated Lithuanians to be more sympathetic to the tsarist order? On first glance, Pivoras's book seems to suggest that this policy could have but little effect, but Kulakauskas's microscopic examination of this subject leaves the question open. In any case, the question could not reach resolution. The Muraviev system's decision to convert Lithuanian writing to Cyrillic characters rejected just this policy, and when Russian officials decided in 1904 to lift the ban, they identified Lithuanian priests as having been a major force in the resistance to this effort to russify the Lithuanians.

Another volume in VDU's list of publications meriting mention here is the collection of Antanas Smetona's letters, written while he was in America: Antano Smetonos korespondencija 1940-1944 (Antanas Smetona's Correspondence, 1940-1944), (1999). (I have published a separate review of this book in Kultūros barai, 1999, no. 10.) The letters, which constitute a major contribution to the study of Smetona's political thought, are part of the Bronius Kviklys archive held by VDU's Emigration Archive.


Those who might want to obtain these or other current Lithuanian books, but have no local bookstores through which they could work, can purchase them through the bookstore Septynios vienatvės, M. Daukšos gatvė 31, LT-3000 Kaunas, Lithuania, Fax:370-7-22-72-91

Alfred Erich Senn is Emeritus Professor at the University of Wisconsin -Madison (USA) and a Visiting Professor at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. He is the author of Lithuania Awakening and five other books as well as more than 100 articles on Lithuanian history and culture. His most recent book is Power, Politics and the Olympic Games (1999).
The Back Page

Wish Granted
A Lithuanian couple had been married for 25 years. They also celebrated their 60th birthdays. During the celebration a laumé (a fairy) appeared and said that, because they had been such a loving couple all those years, she would give them one wish each.

The wife wanted to travel around the world. The fairy waved her wand and boom! the lady had the tickets in her hand.

Next, it was the husband’s turn. He paused for a moment, then said shyly, "Well, I’d like to have a woman 30 years younger than me."

The fairy picked up her wand and boom! He was 90.

Big Country
During the Soviet occupation, Lithuanians used to whisper this joke.

Question: What is the largest country in the world? Answer: Lithuania. Q. How come? A.: Because its Western coastline borders on the Baltic, its capital is Moscow and its population is in Siberia.

[Editor's note: They also tell a parallel story in Estonia. It was recently mentioned by President Meri.]

Our Thanks
We thank all our supporters and advertisers who have made it possible for this journal to continue and to expand. Lithuanian Papers now travels to all continents and is read in 23 countries. Once again, the Societies Council of Tasmania University Union has endorsed our work with a generous grant of $1,000. Many thanks! (The Union's logo is shown at right).

We also thank you, one and all, for the following donations received since our last issue:


Many thanks.

Vince J. TÅŠKŪNAS, President, Lithuanian Studies Society at the University of Tasmania (LSS).